Chicago Tribune Editorial - Excusing an illegal search
Chicago Tribune Editorial - Excusing an illegal search
Copyright © 2006, Chicago Tribune
Published June 18, 2006
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court finally got fed up with seeing police violate the 4th Amendment to the Constitution, which protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. So it established a new policy: When police officers conducted an illegal search, the evidence they found could not be admitted in court. From now on, law enforcement would pay a heavy price for trampling on constitutional rights.
This occasioned a chorus of outrage from police departments, which said the rule would impede law enforcement and force them to provide extensive training on proper searches. Of course, the ban on unreasonable searches was not new. What was new was that police suddenly had powerful incentives to respect the 4th Amendment.
But will they respect it tomorrow? Judging from last week's Supreme Court decision excusing an illegal search, the answer is in doubt. By a 5-4 vote, the court carved out a major exception to the rule, using arguments that would serve just as well to junk the rule entirely.
In this case, Detroit police had a warrant to search the home of Booker Hudson. Upon arriving at his front door, they announced themselves. Without waiting for him to come to the door, they entered the house, where they found cocaine and a loaded firearm. Hudson argued that it was unconstitutional for them to enter without giving him an opportunity to answer the door and that therefore the evidence they seized should be suppressed.
The Michigan court disagreed, however, and so did the Supreme Court. Both courts admitted that by dispensing with the usual "knock-and-announce" rule, the officers did violate Hudson's 4th Amendment rights. A unanimous court found in 1995 that the rule is not just a useful custom, but, in most instances, a constitutional obligation.
Under previous decisions, finding that cops broke the law should have settled the issue: Evidence obtained illegally by the government cannot be used to convict the defendant. But this time, wrote Justice Antonin Scalia, applying the exclusionary rule would be inappropriate. First, because the remedy was disproportionately costly given the violation, and second, because there are other means to penalize police abuses.
What the court didn't acknowledge is that the cost of enforcing the exclusionary rule is usually high: It typically means letting a guilty person go free. That's precisely why it is valuable. It creates a powerful incentive for law enforcement agencies to obey the law. Other purported remedies, such as internal police discipline and civil lawsuits, didn't work before, and there is no reason to think they would work now.
By waiving the exclusionary rule here, the court has told police that they have little to fear from ignoring rights that the 4th Amendment guarantees. That's not a good omen for the preservation of those rights.
Copyright © 2006, Chicago Tribune
Published June 18, 2006
In 1961, the United States Supreme Court finally got fed up with seeing police violate the 4th Amendment to the Constitution, which protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. So it established a new policy: When police officers conducted an illegal search, the evidence they found could not be admitted in court. From now on, law enforcement would pay a heavy price for trampling on constitutional rights.
This occasioned a chorus of outrage from police departments, which said the rule would impede law enforcement and force them to provide extensive training on proper searches. Of course, the ban on unreasonable searches was not new. What was new was that police suddenly had powerful incentives to respect the 4th Amendment.
But will they respect it tomorrow? Judging from last week's Supreme Court decision excusing an illegal search, the answer is in doubt. By a 5-4 vote, the court carved out a major exception to the rule, using arguments that would serve just as well to junk the rule entirely.
In this case, Detroit police had a warrant to search the home of Booker Hudson. Upon arriving at his front door, they announced themselves. Without waiting for him to come to the door, they entered the house, where they found cocaine and a loaded firearm. Hudson argued that it was unconstitutional for them to enter without giving him an opportunity to answer the door and that therefore the evidence they seized should be suppressed.
The Michigan court disagreed, however, and so did the Supreme Court. Both courts admitted that by dispensing with the usual "knock-and-announce" rule, the officers did violate Hudson's 4th Amendment rights. A unanimous court found in 1995 that the rule is not just a useful custom, but, in most instances, a constitutional obligation.
Under previous decisions, finding that cops broke the law should have settled the issue: Evidence obtained illegally by the government cannot be used to convict the defendant. But this time, wrote Justice Antonin Scalia, applying the exclusionary rule would be inappropriate. First, because the remedy was disproportionately costly given the violation, and second, because there are other means to penalize police abuses.
What the court didn't acknowledge is that the cost of enforcing the exclusionary rule is usually high: It typically means letting a guilty person go free. That's precisely why it is valuable. It creates a powerful incentive for law enforcement agencies to obey the law. Other purported remedies, such as internal police discipline and civil lawsuits, didn't work before, and there is no reason to think they would work now.
By waiving the exclusionary rule here, the court has told police that they have little to fear from ignoring rights that the 4th Amendment guarantees. That's not a good omen for the preservation of those rights.
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