Israel making same mistake as US in Iraq, say strategists
Israel making same mistake as US in Iraq, say strategists
By Stephen Fidler and Roula Khalaf in London
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Published: August 3 2006 03:00 | Last updated: August 3 2006 03:00
It may be, say military experts, the future of warfare: a powerful army frustrated by a much weaker enemy.
As Israeli ground troops flood into southern Lebanon in a bid to create a buffer zone to protect its territory from rocket attacks, some military analysts believe Israel has made the same mistakes as the US in Iraq. They say its focus on high-technology warfare and tactical advantage has led it to underestimate the strategic importance of public opinion.
"Local, regional and global perceptions of the conflict will be as important in sustaining a war, and in terminating a conflict on favourable and lasting terms, as the numbers of enemies captured or killed," Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington wrote.
"Israel has failed to understand this in Lebanon as the US to some extent failed to understand it in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq."
Even some pro-Israel commentators in Washington say the conflict has not gone in Israel's favour, particularly since the death of more than 50 Lebanese in Qana on Sunday, and despite claims from Israeli leaders that the group had been severely diminished.
"Rising civilian casualties in Lebanon have not been accompanied by a quantifiable degradation of Hizbollah's military capabilities," argued David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Indeed, yesterday Hizbollah fired more rockets into Israel - about 190, according to news agency reports - than on any day since the fighting began on July 12.
Critically though, Israeli public opinion has stuck behind its military - belying the May 2000 description by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's leader, of Israeli society as like a cobweb in the face of conflict.
There is little doubt that Hizbollah constitutes a problematic adversary. In contrast with the conventional Arab forces Israel easily defeated in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shia militia has become a clever exponent of "asymmetric warfare". Its decentralised command structure means its fighters can use their own initiative without having to consult their leaders in Beirut.
Doron Amir, a former Israeli military intelligence officer now with the Infinity Group, an investment house, says Hizbollah is a hybrid organisation. "Hizbollah is between a guerrilla force and a normal army. It's on the border between the two. It would be a lot easier if we were fighting a country or an organised army."
Nizar Hamza, a professor of international relations at the American University of Kuwait and an expert on Hizbollah, says Hizbollah moves in groups of between three and 10 people, who conduct hit and retreat operations. "Three groups might act like a triangle. If one group is hit and retreats, it doesn't mean you lose the triangle, another could still go in and attack," he says.
Mr Amir says Hizbollah has built its infrastructure amid the civilian population and its fighters attack Israel from civilian areas, leaving Israel with a dilemma about how to respond.
"Nasrallah is an expert in psychological warfare," he says. Publicity is an essential element of his approach, making sure video footage of Hizbollah successes are quickly published and eschewing confrontations of no propaganda value.
Hizbollah appears to have carefully prepared for such a conflict since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. The group has imported thousands of missiles, many from Iran and often transported through Syria. Iran has provided revolutionary guards to help train fighters. Western estimates suggest about 40 such trainers have been in the south, with another 40 moving in and out. Some Israelis put the number in the hundreds.
The group has created a network of tunnels in the south. An unconfirmed report in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a London-based Saudi-financed Arabic daily, said this week that North Korean experts had helped with the tunnelling.
There are wide differences in estimates of how many fighters it has. Western estimates suggest 2,000 frontline fighters with 8,000 in support. Some Iranians claim there may be 20,000. Mr Hamza says possibly 30,000.
A central difficulty for Israel is that its and Hizbollah's military goals are asymmetric too. Hizbollah can claim victory, even if severely battered, if it can still launch a few rockets into Israel or seize an Israeli soldier.
Longer term, the balance between the two sides may be settled only in the minds of Lebanese people: whether they withdraw support from Hizbollah for provoking Israeli attacks or whether they back it for standing up to their powerful neighbour.
By Stephen Fidler and Roula Khalaf in London
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Published: August 3 2006 03:00 | Last updated: August 3 2006 03:00
It may be, say military experts, the future of warfare: a powerful army frustrated by a much weaker enemy.
As Israeli ground troops flood into southern Lebanon in a bid to create a buffer zone to protect its territory from rocket attacks, some military analysts believe Israel has made the same mistakes as the US in Iraq. They say its focus on high-technology warfare and tactical advantage has led it to underestimate the strategic importance of public opinion.
"Local, regional and global perceptions of the conflict will be as important in sustaining a war, and in terminating a conflict on favourable and lasting terms, as the numbers of enemies captured or killed," Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington wrote.
"Israel has failed to understand this in Lebanon as the US to some extent failed to understand it in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq."
Even some pro-Israel commentators in Washington say the conflict has not gone in Israel's favour, particularly since the death of more than 50 Lebanese in Qana on Sunday, and despite claims from Israeli leaders that the group had been severely diminished.
"Rising civilian casualties in Lebanon have not been accompanied by a quantifiable degradation of Hizbollah's military capabilities," argued David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Indeed, yesterday Hizbollah fired more rockets into Israel - about 190, according to news agency reports - than on any day since the fighting began on July 12.
Critically though, Israeli public opinion has stuck behind its military - belying the May 2000 description by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's leader, of Israeli society as like a cobweb in the face of conflict.
There is little doubt that Hizbollah constitutes a problematic adversary. In contrast with the conventional Arab forces Israel easily defeated in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shia militia has become a clever exponent of "asymmetric warfare". Its decentralised command structure means its fighters can use their own initiative without having to consult their leaders in Beirut.
Doron Amir, a former Israeli military intelligence officer now with the Infinity Group, an investment house, says Hizbollah is a hybrid organisation. "Hizbollah is between a guerrilla force and a normal army. It's on the border between the two. It would be a lot easier if we were fighting a country or an organised army."
Nizar Hamza, a professor of international relations at the American University of Kuwait and an expert on Hizbollah, says Hizbollah moves in groups of between three and 10 people, who conduct hit and retreat operations. "Three groups might act like a triangle. If one group is hit and retreats, it doesn't mean you lose the triangle, another could still go in and attack," he says.
Mr Amir says Hizbollah has built its infrastructure amid the civilian population and its fighters attack Israel from civilian areas, leaving Israel with a dilemma about how to respond.
"Nasrallah is an expert in psychological warfare," he says. Publicity is an essential element of his approach, making sure video footage of Hizbollah successes are quickly published and eschewing confrontations of no propaganda value.
Hizbollah appears to have carefully prepared for such a conflict since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. The group has imported thousands of missiles, many from Iran and often transported through Syria. Iran has provided revolutionary guards to help train fighters. Western estimates suggest about 40 such trainers have been in the south, with another 40 moving in and out. Some Israelis put the number in the hundreds.
The group has created a network of tunnels in the south. An unconfirmed report in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a London-based Saudi-financed Arabic daily, said this week that North Korean experts had helped with the tunnelling.
There are wide differences in estimates of how many fighters it has. Western estimates suggest 2,000 frontline fighters with 8,000 in support. Some Iranians claim there may be 20,000. Mr Hamza says possibly 30,000.
A central difficulty for Israel is that its and Hizbollah's military goals are asymmetric too. Hizbollah can claim victory, even if severely battered, if it can still launch a few rockets into Israel or seize an Israeli soldier.
Longer term, the balance between the two sides may be settled only in the minds of Lebanese people: whether they withdraw support from Hizbollah for provoking Israeli attacks or whether they back it for standing up to their powerful neighbour.
posted by Carlos T Mock at 6:25 PM
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